Delegation and the regulation of U.S. financial markets

We analyze the institutional determinants of U.S. financial market regulation with a general model of the policy-making process in which legislators delegate authority to regulate financial risk at both the firm and systemic levels. The model explains changes in U.S. financial regulation leading up to the financial crisis. We test the predictions of the general model with a novel, comprehensive data set of financial regulatory laws enacted specifically between 1950 and 2009. The theoretical and empirical analysis finds that economic and political factors impact Congress’ decision to delegate regulatory authority to executive agencies, which in turn impacts the stringency of financial market regulation, and our estimation results indicate that political factors may have been stronger and resulted in inefficiencies.     

Foreign investment regulation and firm productivity: Granular evidence from Indonesia

When regulating foreign direct investment (FDI), countries often face a trade-off between pursuing national policy interests and suffering efficiency losses due to FDI restrictions. We demonstrate the presence of this trade-off in the case of a protectionist FDI policy in Indonesia. Using a yearly census of Indonesian manufacturing firms from 2000 to 2015, we link product-level changes in binding FDI regulation due to major regulatory tightening to changes in firm-level productivity. Controlling for an extensive set of fixed effects as well as potential political economy drivers of regulation, we show that a tightening of the regulatory environment was successful in reducing foreign capital reliance among regulated firms, and led to increases in FDI among non-regulated firms producing the same product. Despite compensating increases in domestic capital, regulated firms experienced relative productivity losses. This points towards either a less efficient allocation of domestic capital or a general inferiority of domestic capital as compared to foreign investments.     

Conditional Mandates on Management Earnings Forecasts: The Impact on the Cost of Debt

Exploiting a unique conditional disclosure mandate on management earnings forecasts (MEFs) in China, we examine the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on the cost of debt. We find that firms providing voluntary MEFs have lower cost of debt than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters. The results of the channel analyses reveal that voluntary forecasters have greater commitment to voluntary MEFs in future periods than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters, and the precision, accuracy, and timeliness of MEFs are higher for voluntary forecasters than for mandatory forecasters. Additional analyses show that the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on cost of debt are stronger for voluntary forecasters operating in opaque information environments, issuing high-quality and confirming forecasts, controlled by private shareholders, and operating in highly competitive product markets. Overall, our results indicate that, compared with mandatory MEFs, voluntary MEFs are more informative for credit investors, particularly for firms facing greater information risk and operating uncertainty.     

State‐Led Financial Regulation and Representations of Spatial Fixity: The Example of the Spanish Real Estate Sector

This article offers a bottom‐up contribution to the fixity–motion literature. It aims to unravel the apparent contradiction of real estate spatial fixity in Spain, which is portrayed both as a barrier to accumulation and as a unique source of investment by different capitalist actors. Empirically, it describes the shifts in real estate ownership and changes in profit‐making strategies that have taken place across the real estate sector during the crisis years, and the role of the state in these shifts. The article asserts that the idea of spatial fixity representing a spatial barrier for accumulation does not necessarily apply in the Spanish case. It further claims that the tensions in capital circulation through real estate are not only to be found in the action of time, but in different state strategies pursued by various actors. The opposing representations of fixity are the result of state regulation of interest rates, taxation and risk weighting. The state also increasingly promotes land rents as a source of liquidity creation.     

The effects of anticipated goal‐inconsistent behavior on present goal choices

Prior work has examined how, in the pursuit of long‐term goals, past goal behavior influences present goal choices. Instead, the present work focuses on how anticipating future goal behavior, specifically future goal‐inconsistent behavior, influences present goal choices. For example, how anticipating overspending on an upcoming vacation influences current spending behavior. The authors propose that the effect of anticipated goal‐inconsistent behavior on present goal choice is moderated by the perceived changeability of the future behavior. When future goal‐inconsistent behavior is perceived as changeable, consumers tend to imagine it away, and it has no systematic effect on present goal choices. However, when future goal‐inconsistent behavior is perceived as unchangeable, consumers accept it as a matter of fact, and systematic effects occur. Specifically, some consumers not only fail to buffer against future goal‐inconsistent behavior's negative consequences, but tend to exacerbate those consequences by increasing their goal‐inconsistent behavior in the present. Four studies examine this surprising behavior, using an individual difference (the response‐to‐failure scale) to identify when and for whom it occurs. The studies demonstrate the role of perceived changeability using various manipulations across multiple critical goal domains such as spending, eating, and academics.     

家庭承包地“三权”分置的制度逻辑探究 ——基于制度需求与供给的视角

研究目的:阐明"三权"分置的制度逻辑,为制度供给的增量调整提供一种思路。研究方法:文献分析法、政策文本分析法。研究结果:当下农民、新型农业经营者出现新的制度诉求,既有土地承包经权营制度不足以满足该需求。承包地制度供给创新要做实承包权,辨明"三权"分置下经营权所处的位置。土地经营权的权利塑造过程应坚持物债二分法,实现物权法、合同法双重法制途径的并重。研究结论:承包地"三权"分置本质上是理论创新问题,辨清"三权"分置的制度逻辑,仍需以实践需求为出发点,新的制度供给是一个增量调整与立法跟进问题。对经营权性质的探讨有必要融入物债二分逻辑,对于短期限的土地经营权,应按照契约自由原则,实行意思主义,权利类型、权利内容经双方自由创设,对长期存续的土地经营权可实现物权化,实行物权法定主义,按照法定规格与程序流转。     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

Asymmetric effects of housing wealth on college enrolment

We investigate the impact of housing wealth, credit availability and financial distress on college enrolment decisions. We find that housing wealth is negatively related to enrolment in public schools and positively related to enrolment in private schools. This evidence suggests that, on average, students substituted away from private schools towards public institutions during the recent financial crisis.     

Central bank disclosure as a macroprudential tool for financial stability

The Basel Capital Accord (pillar 3) states that disclosure of information (transparency) is essential to financial stability. This study analyzes, through inflation reports, the disclosure of information from the Central Bank of Brazil concerning the credit market. We consider credit risk and capital buffers as measures of financial stability in this analysis. Furthermore, in order to measure the perception of the monetary authority on the credit market, we built two indices based on the central bank’s communication on credit development. We performed a panel data analysis based on a sample of 125 banks for the period from June 1999 to September 2014 (7000 observations). The findings suggest that central bank communication regarding expectations concerning the credit market contributes to financial stability. Therefore, this kind of communication of central banks (about credit development) may constitute an important macroprudential tool to improve financial stability.     

Short-sale constraints and informational efficiency to private information: A natural experiment

Exploiting a regulatory change in short-sale constraints (Regulation SHO) as a natural experiment, this paper examines the effect of short-sale constraints on informational efficiency of stock prices to private information. I find that short-sellers act as informed traders prior to forthcoming analyst news and trade on negative private information. When short-sale constraints are relaxed for pilot stocks (treatment group), both trading volume and stock price sensitivity increase prior to the analyst announcement for bad news but not for good news, relative to that of nonpilot stocks (control group). The findings are consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia model that predicts that short-selling increases the speed of adjustment of stock prices to private negative information. In the cross-section, the effect of Reg SHO is stronger in stocks of firms with weak and uncertain information environments (i.e., small firms and firms with high analyst forecast dispersion).